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I defend a new position in philosophy of mathematics that I call mathematical inferentialism. 
It holds that a mathematical sentence can perform the function of facilitating deductive 
inferences from some concrete sentences to other concrete sentences, that a mathematical 
sentence is true if and only if all of its concrete consequences are true, that the abstract world 
does not exist, and that we acquire mathematical knowledge by confirming concrete 
sentences. Mathematical inferentialism has several advantages over mathematical realism and 
fictionalism. 
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1. Introduction 
Mathematical realism asserts that mathematical objects, such as numbers, triangles, and 
functions, exist in the abstract world, and that a mathematical sentence is true if and only if 
the abstract world is as it says it is. This view is defended by such philosophers as Willard V. 
O. Quine (1948; 1980), Hilary Putnam (1971), Michael Resnik (1997), Mark Colyvan (2001), 
and Alan Baker (2005; 2009; 2012). In contrast, mathematical fictionalism asserts that 
mathematical sentences purport to be about the abstract world, but the abstract world does not 
exist, so they are all false. This view is defended by such philosophers as Mark Balaguer 
(1996; 1998; 2001; 2009), Gideon Rosen (2001), and Mary Leng (2005a; 2005b; 2010). 
This paper defends a new position that I call mathematical inferentialism. The 
discussion proceeds as follows. In Section 2, I explicate mathematical inferentialism and 
display its virtues. I then reply to possible objections to this position. Next, I list the 
disadvantages of mathematical realism in Section 3 and the disadvantages of mathematical 
fictionalism in Section 4. It will become clear that mathematical inferentialism secures the 
objectivity of mathematics and explains the successful use of mathematics in empirical 
science without postulating the existence of the abstract world. (From now on, I drop the 
qualifier ‘mathematical’ in front of the name of a philosophical view.) 
 
2. Inferentialism  
2.1. Content 
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Instrumentalism in philosophy of science is the view that a scientific theory is not a 
description of unobservables but an instrument for organizing our thoughts about observables. 
The instrument is neither true nor false. It is only useful or useless, depending on whether or 
not it makes predictions that turn out to be true. Andreas Osiander (1498-1552) was an 
instrumentalist about the Copernican theory (Kuhn, 1957: 187). George Berkeley (1685-
1753) was an instrumentalist about Newtonian mechanics (Downing, 2013). The insight of 
these instrumentalists is that a scientific theory can help us to make inferences about 
observables, i.e., it exhibits the inferential relationship between observational sentences. 
As Pierre Duhem (1905) observes, an observational sentence cannot be derived from a 
scientific theory alone, and a scientific theory needs to be supplied with auxiliary 
assumptions to entail an observational consequence. What if all of its observational 
consequences are true? According to Bas C. van Fraassen (1980), such a theory is empirically 
adequate. On his account, a scientific theory is a description of both observables and 
unobservables. So it is true or false, depending on whether it correctly represents them. But 
the principle of economy dictates that we believe only that it is empirically adequate (van 
Fraassen, 1985: 294). 
     In my view, instrumentalism in philosophy of science is potentially applicable to 
philosophy of mathematics. A mathematical sentence can perform the function of helping us 
to make deductive inferences from some concrete sentences to other concrete sentences, 
sentences that are rendered true or false by the concrete world. Consider the following three 
concrete sentences: 
 
(i) John gave me an apple. 
(ii) Jane gave me an apple. 
(iii) Therefore, I had two apples. 
 
Assume that I had no apples to begin with, and that John and Jane were my only sources for 
apples. The mathematical sentence, ‘1+1=2,’ tells us that (iii) necessarily follows from (i) and 
(ii), thereby facilitating the deductive inference from (i) and (ii) to (iii). To generalize, a 
mathematical sentence can perform the function of helping us deductively organize our 
thoughts about the concrete world. This functional thesis about a mathematical sentence is the 
key constituent of what I call inferentialism. 
Inferentialism proposes that a mathematical sentence is concretely adequate if and only 
if all of its concrete consequences are true, and that it is concretely inadequate if and only if a 
limited number of concrete consequences are true. A concrete consequence is not derivable 
from a mathematical sentence alone. A mathematical sentence needs to be supplied with 
concrete auxiliaries. For example, ‘1+1=2’ needs to be conjoined with (i) and (ii) to entail 
(iii). ‘1+1=2’ is concretely adequate because it entails only true concrete sentences like (iii) 
when conjoined with other true concrete sentences like (i) and (ii). In contrast, ‘1+1=3’ is 
concretely inadequate because it entails false concrete sentences like ‘I had three apples’ 
when conjoined with true concrete sentences like (i) and (ii). 
A true mathematical sentence is a perfect inference-facilitator, whereas a false 
mathematical sentence is an imperfect inference-facilitator. To use an analogy, a true 
mathematical sentence acts like a system that takes true concrete sentences as an input and 
gives out only other true concrete sentences as an output. It never produces a false concrete 
sentence when given a true concrete sentence. In contrast, a false mathematical sentence acts 
like a system that takes true concrete sentences as an input but can give out a false concrete 
sentence as an output. This analogy, however, is not intended to justify inferentialism but to 
clarify inferentialism. 
3 
 
Inferentialism asserts that a mathematical sentence is true if and only if it is concretely 
adequate, and that it is false if and only if it is concretely inadequate. For example, ‘1+1=2’ is 
true because it is concretely adequate, i.e., because when conjoined with true concrete 
sentences, it can issue only true concrete sentences. In contrast, ‘1+1=3’ is false because it is 
concretely inadequate, i.e., because when conjoined with true concrete sentences, it can issue 
a false concrete sentence. On the inferentialist account, to reiterate, mathematical truth 
coincides with concrete adequacy, and mathematical falsity coincides with concrete 
inadequacy. This semantic thesis about a mathematical sentence is also an important 
constituent of inferentialism.  
What makes a mathematical sentence true or false? Inferentialists answer that it is the 
concrete world. A mathematical sentence is true or false, depending on whether its concrete 
consequences are true or false, and the concrete consequences are true or false in virtue of the 
way the concrete world is. In other words, the truth-value of a mathematical sentence is 
determined by the truth-values of its concrete consequences, and the truth-values of the 
concrete consequences are determined by the concrete world. So it is ultimately the concrete 
world, through a mode of correspondence, that renders a mathematical sentence true or false. 
Do all mathematical sentences have truth-values? Inferentialists answer in the negative. 
A mathematical sentence does not have a truth-value unless it is used to deduce concrete 
sentences from other concrete sentences. In 1968, for example, the Italian physicist, Gabriele 
Veneziano (1942-present), was in search of mathematical equations that would explain the 
strong nuclear force that holds protons and neutrons together. He encountered a two-hundred-
year-old mathematics book in which he found equations written down by the Swiss 
mathematician, Leonhard Euler (1707-1783). Euler devised the equations purely out of 
mathematical curiosity, and he did not use them to explain any phenomena. Two hundred 
years later, Veneziano first related them to the concrete world. On the inferentialist account, 
Euler’s equations did not have truth-values before Veneziano used them to explain the strong 
force. 
It should be clear from the preceding discussion on the truth-makers and the truth-
values of mathematical sentences that inferentialism denies the existence of the abstract 
world as well as rejects the realist semantic thesis that a mathematical sentence is true or false, 
depending on whether the abstract world is as it says it is. The abstract world simply does not 
figure in inferentialism. Thus, inferentialism includes the metaphysical thesis that the abstract 
world does not exist.  
Inferentialism also contains the epistemological thesis that a mathematical sentence is 
confirmed and disconfirmed, just in case some of its concrete consequences are ascertained to 
be true and false, respectively. So it is subject to the tribunal of experience, just as a scientific 
theory is. Confirming a mathematical sentence does not require that we should confirm all of 
its concrete consequences. We only need to confirm some of its concrete consequences 
because ampliative inference is considered to be legitimate in the debate between 
inferentialists and realists.  
A referee asks where mathematical sentences come from. My answer is that they come 
from experience and reason. Reason is the cognitive faculty that enables us to make 
inferences. Thanks to this cognitive faculty, I can infer that 1+1=2, after experiencing that I 
had two apples as a result of receiving an apple from John and another apple from Jane. My 
acquisition of the mathematical sentence does not require that the abstract world should exist 
and cause the mathematical sentence in my mind. Even if the abstract world does not exist, 
we can acquire mathematical sentences. Also, a mathematical sentence can have concrete 
consequences, even if the abstract world does not exist. After all, concrete consequences are 
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nothing but concrete sentences. We acquire concrete sentences from experience, as the 
foregoing example of the apples illustrates. 
A referee suggests that I distinguish between inferentialism and instrumental 
nominalism (Rosen, 2001: 75; Ketland, 2011: 204). Instrumental nominalism is an antirealist 
response to the Quine-Putnam indispensability argument (Quine, 1948; 1980; 1992; Putnam, 
1971; Resnik, 1997; Colyvan, 2001). The argument states that mathematical statements are 
indispensable components of our best scientific theories, that our best scientific theories are 
highly confirmed by observations, and hence that the mathematical statements are worthy of 
our beliefs. Instrumental nominalists retort that we can only believe that our best scientific 
theories nominalistically adequate, i.e., what they say about concreta are true. Thus, 
instrumental nominalists believe what our best scientific theories say about the concrete 
world, but do not believe what they say about the abstract world.  
Let me point out one similarity and one difference between inferentialism and 
instrumental nominalism. The similarity is that both views make use of van Fraassen’s notion 
of empirical adequacy in order to avoid mathematical realism. The difference is that while 
instrumental nominalism is designed to discriminate between trustworthy and untrustworthy 
claims of our best scientific theories, inferentialism is designed to illuminate the inferential 
role that a mathematical sentence plays with respect to concrete sentences. Recall that 
according to inferentialism, a true mathematical sentence is a perfect inference-facilitator, 
and a false mathematical sentence is an imperfect inference-facilitator.  
In summation, inferentialism is composed of the functional thesis, the semantic thesis, 
the metaphysical thesis, and the epistemological thesis. These four theses are intricately 
connected with one another, forming a coherent whole, and this coherent set has several 
virtues, as will become clear in the following section. 
 
2.2. Virtues 
First, inferentialism explains why a mathematical sentence like ‘1+1=2’ was not refuted in 
the history of science. ‘1+1=2’ captures the deductive relationship between concrete 
sentences. Inferentialists would be happy to abandon ‘1+1=2,’ if a counterexample is offered, 
i.e., if a false concrete sentence is deducible from the conjunction of ‘1+1=2’ with true 
concrete sentences. No such counterexample was put forward in the history of science. Such 
a counterexample cannot even be conceived, given that a false concrete sentence cannot be 
deduced from the conjunction of ‘1+1=2’ with true concrete sentences. It is not surprising 
that ‘1+1=2’ was not discarded in the history of science.  
Second, inferentialism secures the objectivity of mathematics. A mathematical 
sentence is true not because we think that it is true but because when conjoined with true 
concrete sentences, it can issue only true concrete consequences. The concrete sentences are 
true not because we think that they are true but because the concrete world is as they say it is, 
i.e., because they correspond to the concrete world. Their truth-values are determined by the 
concrete world. To take an example, the concrete sentence ‘I had two apples’ is true not 
because we think that it is true but because it corresponds to the concrete world. It follows 
that it is ultimately the concrete world that makes a mathematical sentence true, and hence 
that a mathematical sentence is true as objectively as a concrete sentence is true. 
Third, inferentialism also explains why mathematics is successfully and widely used in 
empirical science. Mathematics is useful in empirical science because it shows which 
concrete sentences necessarily follow from which other concrete sentences. With the help of 
mathematics, scientists can make deductive inferences from the sentences describing the 
known aspect of the concrete world to the sentences describing the unknown aspect of the 
concrete world. Once they see the logical relationship between the concrete sentences, they 
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can make true predictions about the unknown aspect of the concrete world. Thus, 
inferentialism presents a coherent picture or systematic narrative of how mathematics is a 
useful tool to investigate the concrete world. 
Another referee asks the following questions. If a mathematical sentence shows which 
concrete sentences follow from which other concrete sentences, shouldn’t it already have a 
truth-value in order to do that? How can its truth-value be determined by the concrete world? 
Answers to these questions can be found in instrumentalists’ insights. They claim that a 
scientific theory does not have a truth-value, and yet can show which observational sentences 
follow from which other observational sentences. Similarly, I claim that even if a 
mathematical sentence does not already have a truth-value, it can show which concrete 
sentences follow from which other concrete sentences. Also, on the inferentialist account, a 
mathematical sentence is true just in case it is concretely adequate, i.e., all of its concrete 
consequences are true. The concrete consequences are true or false, depending on the way the 
concrete world is. Therefore, their truth-values are determined by the concrete world. 
Fourth, under the inferentialist framework, it is not mysterious how we acquire 
mathematical knowledge. We know that a mathematical sentence is true, only if we know 
that some of its concrete consequences are true. Thus, we can acquire mathematical 
knowledge via acquiring concrete knowledge. Acquiring concrete knowledge is not 
considered to be problematic in the debate over the ontological status of mathematical objects. 
All rivaling participants in the debate take it to be uncontroversial that we can have concrete 
knowledge. To question our ability to acquire concrete knowledge is to at once question the 
very starting point of the debate. 
The referee suggests that I should explain what I mean by ‘mathematical knowledge.’ 
Didn’t Euler have mathematical knowledge before his equations were used by Beneziano in 
1968? 
Set aside the Gettier problem, and suppose for the sake of argument that Plato is right 
that knowledge is justified true belief. I believe that 1+1=2. It is true that 1+1=2 in that all of 
its concrete consequences are true. I am justified in believing that 1+1=2 in that I can confirm 
some of its concrete consequences. Therefore, I have the justified true belief that 1+1=2. 
Euler did not have the mathematical knowledge concerning his equations, for the equations 
did not even have truth-values, and he did not have observational evidence for them. 
 
2.3. Objections and Replies 
Let me now turn to possible objections to inferentialism. Objectors might say that there are 
mathematical sentences asserting how mathematical objects are related to concrete objects. 
They are such sentences as ‘The number of tigers in this zoo is 5’ and ‘The distance, in 
meters, is 10.’ Let me call such sentences connecting sentences. The idea is that they seem to 
connect mathematical objects with concrete objects. They imply that mathematical objects 
exist, and that mathematical objects are related to concrete objects in a certain manner. Thus, 
they undermine inferentialism, which denies the existence of mathematical objects. 
How do inferentialists respond to the preceding objection? We should not be misled by 
the linguistic structure of a connecting sentence, just as we should not be misled by the 
linguistic structure of a bridge principle. A scientific theory is composed of internal and 
bridge principles, as Carl G. Hempel (1966: 72-75) observes. An internal principle is a claim 
about how theoretical entities behave. It is couched only in theoretical terms. By contrast, a 
bridge principle is a claim about how the behavior of the theoretical entities is related to 
observational entities. It is couched in both theoretical terms and observational terms. For 
example, the caloric theory of heat includes the bridge principle that temperature is 
proportional to the amount of caloric fluids. Note that the linguistic structure of the bridge 
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principle indicates that caloric fluids exist when they do not. Instrumentalists argue that 
theoretical terms like ‘caloric fluids’ are merely useful instruments for organizing our 
thoughts about observables, although they appear to refer to theoretical entities when they are 
used in sentences. Analogously, inferentialists argue that numerals like ‘5’ and ‘10’ are 
merely useful instruments to accurately represent the concrete states of affairs, although they 
appear to refer to abstract objects when they are used in sentences.  
Let me move to another possible objection to inferentialism. I argued that ‘1+1=2’ can 
deductively organize concrete sentences, but I provided only one example of a group of 
concrete sentences deductively organized by the mathematical sentence. How do we know 
whether a certain group of concrete sentences are deductively organized by a mathematical 
sentence or not? Inferentialism is an incomplete theory, critics might argue, until I specify all 
the concrete sentences the mathematical sentence deductively organizes, or until I provide an 
account of how we go about determining whether or not a group of concrete sentences are 
deductively organized by a mathematical sentence. 
In my view, the foregoing criticism is misguided. Recall that van Fraassen claims that a 
scientific theory is empirically adequate if and only if all of its observational consequences 
are true. He has never enumerated all the empirical consequences of a scientific theory to 
flesh out his position. Even so, his position has never been regarded as being incomplete in 
the philosophy of science literature.  
Let me turn to yet another possible objection to inferentialism. Objectors might say that 
inferentialism cannot handle the validity of arguments with pure mathematical premises and 
conclusions. Consider, for example, the following argument:  
 
2x + 3y =13 
3x – y = 3 
∴ x=2, and y=3 
 
The premises and the conclusion of this argument are all pure mathematical sentences in that 
they are not applied to the concrete world. Even if they are independent of the concrete world, 
the argument is deductively valid. But why is it deductively valid? How can inferentialism 
make sense of deductive validity? 
My answer to this question is that it is wrong to think that inferentialism does not allow 
for mathematical sentences to form a deductively valid or sound argument. To use an analogy, 
van Fraassen believes that thermodynamics and statistical mechanics are merely empirically 
adequate. Even so, he can believe that thermodynamics is deducible from statistical 
mechanics. It is not the case that since he believes that they are merely empirically adequate, 
he cannot believe that thermodynamics is deducible from statistical mechanics. Likewise, 
inferentialists believe that true mathematical sentences are merely concretely adequate. Even 
so, they can believe that a mathematical sentence is deducible from other mathematical 
sentences. It is not the case that since they believe that mathematical sentences are merely 
concretely adequate, they cannot believe that a mathematical sentence is deducible from other 
mathematical sentences. 
 
3. Disadvantages of Realism 
Realism has three disadvantages over inferentialism. First, realism claims that the abstract 
world exists. It is inhabited by abstract entities, such as mathematical objects and 
propositions. They are aspatial and atemporal entities. Hence, they are causally inert. They 
can interact neither with one another nor with concrete entities, such as electrons, black holes, 
and human beings. According to realism, ‘1+1=2’ is true not because we think that it is true 
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but because the abstract world is as it says it is. Thus, realism secures the objectivity of 
mathematics by postulating the existence of the abstract world. In contrast, as I have outlined 
in Section 2, inferentialism does it without positing the existence of abstract world. Therefore, 
the principle of economy dictates us to choose inferentialism over realism. 
Second, under the realist framework, it is mysterious how we can acquire mathematical 
knowledge (Benacerraf, 1973; Balaguer, 2014). As stated earlier, abstract entities are causally 
inert, so they cannot interact with concrete entities, including human beings. We usually 
acquire knowledge about a concrete object by interacting with it. For example, we interact 
with a cat, and as a result, we come to know about it. It is impossible, however, for us to 
interact with a triangle. Consequently, realists owe us an account of how mathematical 
knowledge is possible. In contrast, inferentialists already have an uncontroversial account of 
how mathematical knowledge is possible, as we have seen in Section 2. 
Third, under the realist framework, it remains unexplained why mathematics is useful 
in empirical science. A mathematical sentence is a description of the abstract world, not of 
the concrete world. It is not clear, however, how the description of the abstract world can be 
useful in investigating the concrete world, given that the abstract world is aspatial and 
atemporal while the concrete world is both spatial and temporal. Suppose that we want to 
investigate the abstract world. We want to know what the abstract world looks like, what its 
construct is like, what type of objects inhabits such a world, what properties the inhabitants 
have, and so forth. Can concrete sentences be useful in the new discipline? Consider concrete 
sentences like ‘All human beings are mortal.’ Such a sentence is about concrete objects that 
change over time. Hence, it is useless in organizing our thoughts about abstracta that do not 
change over time. Similarly, a mathematical sentence, if it is a description of the abstract 
world, should be useless in empirical science. But it is obvious that mathematical sentences 
are useful in empirical science. This obvious fact is an anomaly to realism. 
In response, realists might embrace the inferentialist functional thesis that a 
mathematical sentence can perform the function of facilitating deductive inferences from 
concrete sentences to other concrete sentences, while adhering to the realist semantic thesis 
that a mathematical sentence performs the function of describing the abstract world. They can 
then explain why mathematics is useful in empirical science without abandoning the realist 
semantic thesis. 
This response, however, is problematic. The inferentialist functional thesis and the 
realist semantic thesis conflict with each other, as we have seen in this section. It is 
implausible that a description of the abstract world can be useful in organizing concrete 
sentences. Furthermore, once realists embrace the inferentialist functional thesis, it is otiose 
to say that the abstract world exists, and that a mathematical sentence is true or false in virtue 
of the way the abstract world is. The realist metaphysical thesis and semantic thesis are 
superfluous because only the inferentialist functional thesis is necessary to explain the 
successful use of mathematics in empirical science and to secure the objectivity of 
mathematics. Again, Ockham’s razor militates against realism. 
 
4. Disadvantages of Fictionalism 
Fictionalism in philosophy of mathematics is the view that “(a) our mathematical sentences 
and theories do purport to be about abstract mathematical objects, as platonism
1
 suggests, but 
(b) there are no such things as abstract objects, and so (c) our mathematical theories are not 
true” (Balaguer, 2013). Keep in mind that fictionalists accept the realist semantic thesis that a 
mathematical sentence is a description of the abstract world, but reject the realist 
                                                          
1
 Mathematical realism is also called platonism in philosophy of mathematics. It differs from Platonism, the 
philosophy of Plato. 
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metaphysical thesis that mathematical objects exist in the abstract world, and hence accept 
the corollary that all mathematical sentences are false. I strictly follow Balaguer’s 
formulation of fictionalism in this paper.  
Fictionalism, as defined by Balaguer above, is similar to John L. Mackie’s (1977) error 
theory in metaethics. The error theory holds that a moral sentence is not an expression of 
emotion but a description of the world. However, all moral sentences are false because moral 
properties and facts do not inhabit the world. Thus, error theorists accept the moral realist 
semantic thesis that a moral sentence has a truth-value, but reject the moral realist 
metaphysical thesis that there are moral properties and facts. Both error theorists and 
fictionalists accept their realist counterparts’ semantic theses but reject their realist 
counterparts’ metaphysical theses. 
Let’s now turn to the comparison between fictionalism and inferentialism. There are an 
important similarity and an important difference between them. The similarity is that both 
views reject the realist metaphysical thesis that mathematical objects are real. The difference 
is that fictionalism affirms, while inferentialism denies, that a mathematical sentence purports 
to be about the abstract world, and that all mathematical sentences are false. Recall that, 
according to inferentialism, the abstract world does not exist, and a mathematical sentence is 
true or false, depending on whether all of its concrete consequences are true or not. Hence, 
some mathematical sentences, such as ‘1+1=2,’ are true, and other mathematical sentences, 
such as ‘1+1=3,’ are false.  
Fictionalism suffers from three disadvantages that inferentialism does not. First, 
fictionalism cannot explain why mathematics is useful in empirical science. Fictionalism 
claims that mathematical sentences are descriptions of the abstract world. As noted in Section 
3, it is not clear how a description of the aspatial and atemporal world can be useful in 
empirical science which aims to explain and predict events that occur in space and time. Of 
course, a false scientific theory can be successful. For example, the Ptolemaic theory was 
successful in predicting the motions of celestial bodies in the past. There is, however, a 
fundamental difference between a false scientific theory and a false mathematical sentence. A 
false scientific theory is a description of the concrete world, whereas the false mathematical 
sentence is a description of the abstract world.  
Second, fictionalism attributes falsities to mathematical beliefs, whereas inferentialism 
does not. Ordinary folk believe, for example, that ‘1+1=2’ is true. Fictionalists claim that 
their belief is false, whereas inferentialists claim that it is true. The principle of charity 
requires that we should not ceteris paribus attribute false beliefs to others. Both 
inferentialism and fictionalism strive for avoiding the realist metaphysical thesis that 
mathematical objects are abstract entities. In the process of achieving that aim, inferentialism 
complies with, while fictionalism violates, the principle of charity. 
In addition, it is implausible that ordinary folk really have the intention that their 
mathematical sentences are descriptions of the abstract world. Ordinary folk are not even 
aware of the implications of what it is for an object to exist outside of space and time. For 
example, even God cannot do anything in the abstract world. He cannot even move his finger 
because the motion of his finger requires the flow of time and because time does not pass in 
the abstract world (Park, 2017: 164). Also, an atemporal and aspatial object is not 
visualizable. It is psychologically impossible to form the image of an object that does not 
occupy space and time. As Stephen Kosslyn (1980: 1) observes, however, ordinary people 
often think in terms of pictures. When asked which is larger, a tennis ball or a volleyball, they 
form the images of a tennis ball and a volleyball in their minds, and then compare them. 
These considerations support the view that ordinary folk do not believe that their 
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mathematical sentences are descriptions of the abstract world. Only highly trained people like 
philosophers have the intention to describe the abstract world with mathematical sentences. 
Third, it is not clear how fictionalism can secure the objectivity of mathematics. Is 
there an objective basis for choosing ‘1+1=2’ over ‘1+1=3’? If there is, what is it? 
Fictionalists cannot say that we ought to choose the former over the latter because the former 
is true and the latter is false, for they claim that all mathematical sentences are false. What 
then is the difference between ‘1+1=2’ and ‘1+1=3’? Balaguer (2001; 2009; 2013) answers 
this question from a fictionalist point of view. In my view, however, his answer is not 
convincing. 
Balaguer suggests that ‘1+1=2’ is fictionalistically correct, whereas ‘1+1=3’ is 
fictionalistically incorrect. What does it mean to say that a mathematical sentence is 
fictionalistically correct? 
 
..a mathematical sentence is fictionalistically correct if and only if it would have been true if 
there had actually existed abstract mathematical objects of the kinds that platonists have in mind. 
(Balaguer, 2013) 
 
Thus, ‘1+1=2’ is fictionalistically correct because if the abstract world exists, then it would 
be true, and ‘1+1=3’ is fictionalistically incorrect because if the abstract world exists, then it 
would be false. The abstract world does not exist. But if it does, then it would make ‘1+1=2’ 
true and ‘1+1=3’ false. Thus, a counterfactual making use of the abstract world can be used 
to determine whether a mathematical sentence is fictionalistically correct or incorrect. 
Balaguer’s proposal, however, can be reduced to absurdity. If his proposal is correct, 
then it should also be legitimate to say that ‘1+1=3’ and ‘The Earth is flat’ are 
fictionalistically correct because if another abstract world in which 1+1=3 exists, then 
‘1+1=3’ would be true, and if another concrete world in which the Earth is flat exists, then 
‘The Earth is flat’ would be true. Neither that abstract world nor that concrete world exists. 
But if they did, then ‘1+1=3’ and ‘The Earth is flat’ would be true. It is not clear on what 
grounds Balaguer could say that (1) is legitimate, but (2) and (3) are illegitimate: 
 
(1) ‘1+1=2’ is fictionalistically correct because if the abstract world exists, then it 
would be true. 
(2) ‘1+1=3’ is fictionalistically correct because if another abstract world in which 
1+1=3 exists, then it would be true. 
(3) ‘The Earth is flat’ is fictionalistically correct because if another concrete world in 
which the Earth is flat exists, then it would be true.  
 
Thus, ‘1+1=2,’ ‘1+1=3,’ and ‘The Earth is flat’ are all on the same boat. Any mathematical 
sentence or any concrete sentence could be made fictionalistically correct simply by 
formulating a relevant counterfactual.  
The preceding discussion is intended to show that Balaguer’s distinction between 
fictionalistically correct and incorrect sentences is untenable, and that Balaguer’s attempt to 
secure the objectivity of mathematics fails. The failure of his proposal stems from the fact 
that it invokes the abstract world rather than the concrete world to establish the objectivity of 
mathematics. Given that the abstract world is not the only world available for the formulation 
of a relevant counterfactual, it is not clear which worlds we should choose and which worlds 
we should not choose to formulate a relevant counterfactual. So it is a mistake in the first 
place to try to ground the objectivity of mathematics on a counterfactual invoking the abstract 
world. 
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In my view, the objectivity of mathematics should be grounded on the concrete world 
rather than on the abstract world or on a counterfactual making use of the abstract world. As 
we have seen in Section 2, inferentialism claims that the concrete world contributes to the 
objectivity of mathematics. Any philosophical account of the objectivity of mathematics that 
does not recognize the contribution of the concrete world is missing something important. 
How would fictionalists respond to my preceding discussion? They might object that I 
mischaracterized fictionalism. Fictionalism does not claim that all mathematical sentences are 
false. It rather claims that some mathematical sentences are false, and that other mathematical 
sentences are true. Fictionalists are well aware that the negation of a mathematical sentence is 
also a mathematical sentence, and that it is impossible for both of them to be false. For 
example, it is impossible that both ‘The sum of the three angles of a triangle is 180 degrees’ 
and ‘The sum of the three angles of a triangle is not 180 degrees’ are false. If one is false, 
then the other must be true, and vice versa. So fictionalism allows for true mathematical 
sentences. 
In my view, however, it is wrong to think that if a sentence is false, then its negation 
must be true. It is possible for both of them to be false. Consider the sentences, ‘The present 
king of France is bald’ and ‘The present king of France is not bald.’ One of them is the 
negation of the other. But both of them are false because they are about an object that does 
not exist. Similarly, it is wrong to think that either a mathematical sentence or its negation is 
true. On the fictionalist account, both of them are false because they are about an object that 
does not exist. 
Moreover, I am following Balaguer on the interpretational issue of whether 
fictionalism claims or not that all mathematical sentences are false. Recall that in the 
beginning of this section I quoted Balaguer’s definition of fictionalism according to which 
“our mathematical theories are not true” (Balaguer, 2013). If there are fictionalists in the 
literature who claim that some mathematical sentences are true, my preceding argument from 
the principle of charity does not apply to them. I leave, however, to those fictionalists the 
thorny issue of how to cash out the objectivity of mathematics and the difference between the 
truth and the falsehood of a mathematical sentence within the fictionalist framework. 
 
5. Conclusion 
Inferentialism has some virtues. It explains why a mathematical sentence like ‘1+1=2’ was 
not and could not be refuted in the history of science. It secures the objectivity of 
mathematics and accounts for the successful use of mathematics in empirical science. It 
presents an uncontroversial account of how we acquire mathematical knowledge. It has these 
virtues, and yet it does not postulate the existence of the abstract world. So it is a good 
philosophical theory of mathematics from the point of view of Ockham’s razor. 
Both realism and fictionalism have disadvantages over inferentialism. Realism secures 
the objectivity of mathematics at the cost of positing the existence of the abstract world. It 
faces the difficult task of explaining how we can acquire mathematical knowledge and why 
mathematics is useful in empirical science. Fictionalism does not fare better than realism. It 
also faces the daunting task of explaining why mathematics is useful in empirical science. It 
is saddled with an implausible assumption that ordinary folk have a clear conception of the 
abstract world. Finally, it jeopardizes the objectivity of mathematics. 
To conclude, there are fewer obstacles on the road to inferentialism than on the roads to 
realism and fictionalism. 
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